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PROPOSAL FOR A SUBSTANCE ABUSE TESTING ACT:
THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE DRUG-FREE
WORKPLACE, INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW*
ABOUT THE REPORT
This is the Report of the Task Force on the Drug-Free Workplace, sponsored by the Institute of Bill of Rights Law of the
College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. The
Report contains an introduction describing the mission of the
Task Force and the guiding philosophical principles it embraced,
an Executive Summary providing a summary overview of the
proposed model statute, the formal text of the proposed model
Substance Abuse Testing Act, including commentary illuminating
the intent and rationales underlying each provision of the Act,
biographical information on all members of the Task Force, and
a brief individual statement by each Task Force member.
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE
The Institute of Bill of Rights Law was established at William
and Mary in 1982 to support research and education on the
Constitution and Bill of Rights. Today the Institute is a dynamic
center for mediating the past and the future, making debate over
the meaning of the Bill of Rights relevant to policy conflicts in
the modern world.
ABOUT THE 1991 CONFERENCE
The Institute of Bill of Rights Law will conduct a conference
on drug-testing in the workplace, and the recommendations contained in this report, on November 16, 1991, at the College of
William and Mary. The papers generated for that conference will
be published in the Annual Bill of Rights Symposium issue of
the William and Mary Law Review, which will be distributed at
the conference. For further information on this Report, the November 1991 conference, or the law review symposium issue on
drug-testing in the workplace, contact the staff at the Institute
of Bill of Rights Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, Williamsburg, VA 23185; 804/221-3810, fax 804/221-3775.
* Reprinted with permission of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law of the College of
William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 1991.
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Disclaimer: Titles and organizations are listed for identification
purposes only. The contents of this document and any opinions
expressed herein reflect the views of the individual and not those
of the organization with which the individual is affiliated.
INTRODUCTION
In January, 1990, the Institute of Bill of Rights Law first
assembled a Task Force of sixteen members, from a wide variety
of backgrounds and viewpoints, to examine the issues surrounding drug-testing in the workplace. The members included leaders
from the corporate world, organized labor, government, public
health, higher education, criminology, the judiciary, and the bar.
Out of their efforts this report emerged, setting forth a model
Substance Abuse Testing Act, regulating substance abuse testing
in the workplace.
Concern over drug abuse is widespread, and drug-testing programs have recently gained momentum in response to that concern. A growing number of public agencies and private sector
corporations are implementing testing programs. While concern
over drug abuse runs high, comprehensive and reliable data
demonstrating the costs of drug abuse in the workplace or the
efficacy of testing is relatively scarce. The rhetoric surrounding
drug-testing is not always-matched by hard supporting evidence.
The members of the Task Force were nevertheless convinced
that drug-testing is a reality in contemporary society, and is
probably here to stay. It is therefore appropriate to recommend
legislation reconciling the competing interests in a balanced and
comprehensive manner.
The members of the Task Force began by reaching a consensus
on a number of guiding principles. As a threshold matter, it was
agreed that drug-testing implicated privacy interests of the highest order, and therefore testing should be regulated to preserve
individual privacy and dignity. A majority of the Task Force
members were convinced that testing in the workplace may be
justified only by concerns relevant to the workplace, such as the
safety of workers or the public. Drug-testing in the workplace
thus should not be implemented merely as a general aid to law
enforcement. The Task Force also concluded that it was improper
to ignore alcohol abuse in coming to grips with drug-testing. The
social costs of alcohol abuse substantially exceed the costs of
illegal drug abuse. If employers are serious about addressing the
safety and health problems associated with substance abuse, they
should therefore include alcohol among the substances to be
detected through testing.
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The Task Force members believe that this is a propitious time
for balanced, uniform legislation on drug-testing. The national
preoccupation with the "war on drugs" has subsided somewhat
as other public issues have come to the fore, but drug abuse
remains a matter of substantial public concern. Now that the
rhetoric surrounding the war on drugs has cooled, the time is
ripe for level-headed and even-handed legislation. The current
legal picture governing drug-testing is chaotic. A significant
number of states have adopted drug-testing statutes in recent
years, but the approaches taken differ widely. Drug-testing procedures have also been imposed on a number of industries by
federal law. The uneven patchwork of state and federal legislation
creates a maze of conflicting regulations, placing a considerable
burden on corporations doing business in interstate commerce.
Drug abuse is a national problem, drug-testing is a national
phenomenon, and a national approach to both is required. The
Task Force members therefore propose that the model Act set
forth in this report be considered either as federal legislation, or
as state legislation enacted by individual states as a prelude to
eventual adoption by all states as uniform legislation.
Current law also fails to provide adequate protection for employees. Court challenges to drug-testing by employees have
recently proliferated. Litigation attacking drug-testing on constitutional and common law grounds has created a volatile legal
picture in which it is impossible to predict with confidence what
types of drug-testing programs courts will or W, not approve.
The general trend, however, has been for courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, not to intervene to set rigorous
procedural or substantive standards governing drug-testing. The
courts have not imposed a judicially created balance of competing
interests on society, but have instead left that task to the political
process. The members of the Task Force have approached this
dynamic and often confusing array of court decisions as an
invitation to place into the arena of public debate a proposal that
reflects American society's legitimate concerns with public health
and safety, as well as its deeply embedded tradition of respect
for individual privacy and dignity. The members of the Task
Force are convinced that the vast majority of Americans do
indeed want balance: they are concerned with drug abuse, but
they also regard drug-testing as a very serious incursion on
individual privacy. Americans want and expect drug-testing procedures that are fair, accurate, and dignified.
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The model legislation set forth in this report strives to achieve
that balance. The Chair and principal draftsman of the proposal
was Professor Paul Marcus, a distinguished American law professor and former Dean of the University of Arizona College of
Law. The substance of the proposal was a collective effort,
reflecting the energetic and well-considered contributions of an
exceptionally thoughtful and conscientious group of leading citizens. The Institute of Bill of Rights Law and the College of
William and Mary are deeply indebted to their spirited public
service.
RODNEY A. SMOLLA
Arthur B. Hanson
Professor of Law and
Director, Institute of Bill
of Rights Law
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE PROPOSAL

Who May Be Tested and When
The Act applies to employers and employees in both the public
and private sectors. Section 6 contains the substantive core of
the Act, describing the circumstances in which testing is permitted. Testing is permitted in only five situations.
(1) Testing for Cause. An employee may be required to undergo
testing if reasonable suspicion exists that the employee is currently under the influence and that job performance or the work
environment may be adversely affected.
(2) Random Testing. The Act authorizes random testing for
only a narrow range of employees. Random testing is permitted
in three situations: when an employee occupies a job in which
impairment could cause catastrophic injury to the public; when
a plant, facility, or operating unit has exhibited a recent history
of substance abuse and physical injury may well result from
employees coming to work impaired; or when the employment
position involves activities directly connected to the interdiction,
detection, punishment, or treatment of illegal drug use.
It should be emphasized that the Act does not authorize indiscriminate random testing but rather seeks to confine such testing
to situations in which the social interests served by random
testing are especially high. The Task Force rejected the view,
for example, that random testing should be permitted whenever
impairment might create "safety" risks, because such an elastic
formulation could be stretched to encompass virtually all employees. Thus, the Act limits random testing on safety grounds
to situations in which the safety concerns are of an unusually
high magnitude-such as certain mass transportation employees-or situations in which the probability of harm is unusually
high-as when prior evidence establishes a widespread drug
abuse problem at a particular plant or facility.
The Task Force did believe that employees directly connected
to drug interdiction, detection, punishment, or treatment present
a unique case for permitting random testing, because of the high
public interest in deterring corruption and dishonesty relating to
drug use in such positions.
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The limited approval of random testing reflects the judgment
of the majority of the Task Force that the justifications for
substance abuse testing in the workplace should have a nexus to
the workplace, and not become a general tool of law enforcement,
as well as the judgment that the other forms of testing authorized
under the Act, such as testing for cause, post-accident testing,
testing after prior detected use, and applicant testing, combine
to provide employers with adequate opportunities to vindicate
their interest in achieving a drug-free workplace.
(3) Testing After Prior Use. The Act permits unscheduled testing of individuals who have received a confirmed positive test
result for up to one year following the positive test or return to
work, whichever comes later.
(4) Post-Accident Testing. Employees may be tested immediately
following an accident involving serious injury if they occupy a
position in which they may have caused the accident.
(5) Applicant Testing. The Act addresses the issue of whether
to allow employers to test all applicants for initial hire. The
members of the Task Force were more deeply divided over this
issue than any other policy conflict raised by drug-testing, with
the sentiments for and against applicant testing virtually even.
Two alternatives are offered. The arguments for each side of
this issue are presented in the commentary to section 6 of the
Act, and in the individual statements of several Task Force
members, appearing at the end of this report.
Proceduresfor Drug-Testing
The Act contains extensive procedural regulation of the drugtesting process. Among the most significant are the following
requirements:
(1) Written Policy. All employers must adopt a formal written
drug-testing policy if they wish to engage in drug-testing. The
Act sets forth in detail the elements that must be addressed in
all policies.
(2) Notice. Employers must provide extensive notice of their
drug-testing policy.
(3) Substances. The substances for which employees may be
tested must be specified by statute and in the employer's policy.
(4) Laboratories. Testing laboratories must be regulated for
accuracy and quality control.
(5) Confirmation of Test Results. All positive screening tests
must be confirmed by a second more accurate test.
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(6) Limited Suspension for First Offense. Employees may not
be terminated for a first offense. The maximum sanction for the
first positive confirmed test result is suspension for up to 30
days.
(7) Collection Procedures. The actual process of collection must
be regulated to ensure accuracy, privacy, and dignity.
(8) Confidentiality and Access. Test results are confidential;
employees must be given access to all information concerning
their test results.
Education and Treatment
The Act imposes an affirmative duty on all employers who
undertake a testing program to educate employees about the
dangers associated with substance abuse. It further requires that
employers have the capacity to refer individuals to treatment
and rehabilitation programs. Participation in these programs is
at the employees' own expense, unless otherwise provided by
agreement or employee benefit program.
Remedies and Enforcement
The Act permits the attorney general, an employee, an applicant, or any other aggrieved person to bring a civil court action
to effectuate the purposes of the Act, and authorizes courts to
provide appropriate declaratory, injunctive, or compensatory relief. When knowing or reckless violations of the Act occur, damages in the amount of two times compensatory relief may also
be awarded. The Act provides for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs.
The Act does not contemplate the creation of any new administrative agency to supervise its enforcement, nor does it require
any substantial additional enforcement burdens to be absorbed
by existing agencies. The Act does, nevertheless, require the
intervention of an administrative agency (such as the Department
of Health and Human Services) to perform such tasks as the
designation of approved testing laboratories, promulgation of
specific regulations governing specimen collection procedures,
and promulgation of standards for the qualifications and training
of Review Officers who participate in the test evaluation process.
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THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE TESTING ACT
PREAMBLE.

The abuse of illegal drugs and alcohol is a matter of substantial
public concern. This Act was created to develop uniform standards
and requirements regarding the testing of employees and job applicants for use of such substances in the work setting. It is the
legislative purpose that this Act ensure the protection of the public,
the safety of the workplace, and the preservation of privacy and
dignity.
COMMENT

Widespread concern over substance abuse exists in the United
States. Current data appear to support the notion that actual
use of both alcohol and unlawful drugs is declining rather considerably across the country compared to use in recent years.
But public concern persists, and this concern has been reflected
in statutes passed throughout the country and in the willingness
of courts to allow drug-testing. At the same time, because testing
implicates serious concerns over the preservation of individual
privacy and dignity, rules controlling testing are vital.
Testing for the abuse of alcohol is included here because the
actual impact of alcohol use in the employment setting is far
more adverse than the impact of unlawful drugs.
The preamble makes clear that the statute is designed not
simply to protect any particular constituency or special interest
group. Rather it is enacted to ensure that public safety will be
promoted, and the rights of individuals will be preserved and
protected.
SECTION

1.

NOTICE AND WRITTEN POLICY REQUIREMENTS.

No employer may request or require an employee or an applicant
for employment to undergo a substance abuse test unless the employer has satisfied the following minimum requirements:
(a) ADOPTION OFA WRITTEN POLICY. In order to establish
a substance abuse testing program, the employer must adopt in
writing a detailed policy setting forth the specifics of such a
program, as indicated in section (c).
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(b) NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND APPLICANTS. The employer must post notice of the policy in prominent employee access
areas in the place of employment and must give a written copy of
the policy to each affected employee, and each job applicant.Notice
must also be posted, and the policy distributed,any time the policy
is changed.
(c) REQUIRED INFORMATION IN THE WRITTEN POLICY.
The written policy must include at least the following information:
(1) a statement of the employer's policy respecting drug
and alcohol use by employees;
(2) the job classificationsfor which employees or job applicants are subject to testing;
(3) the circumstancesunder which testing may be required;
(4) the substances as to which testing may be required;
(5) the testing methods and collection procedures to be used;
(6) the consequences of a refusal to participatein the testing;
(7) any adverse personnel action that may be taken based
on the testing procedure or results;
(8) the right of an individual to explain, in confidence,
positive test results;
(9) the right of an individual to obtain all information
related to the testing of that individual;
(10) the confidentiality requirements for the testing;
(11) the available appeal procedures, remedies, and sanctions;
(12) the substance abuse programs for education and treatment available to the individual.
COMMENT

This section sets forth in detail the minimum notice requirements that must be satisfied in order for an employer to establish
and maintain a testing program. Rather than give broad policy
formulations, the section establishes specific standards that both
allow for testing by employers and protect the rights of employees. The notion that an administrative agency should, at the
outset, review and approve these standards, was considered and
was rejected, principally out of a desire to avoid undue delay
and expense for employers seeking to comply with the Act.
It is essential that the employer adopt a written policy and
that the policy be distributed to all concerned employees and
applicants. This notice also must be provided in the form of
posted information both at the time of the adoption of a drugtesting plan and whenever changes are made in such a plan. The
particular items required should provide necessary information
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concerning the type of testing, the impact on individual employees, and the remedies and educational programs available in
connection with the plan. Other parts of the Act are not overly
specific, but instead show deference to administrative decisionmakers-such as the provisions concerning specimen collection
procedures, or the qualifications of review officers. But the detailed discussion in this section reflects a need for legislative
judgments that will balance the interests of the public, the
employers, and the employees.
SECTION

2. THE TESTING PROCESS.

(a) SUBSTANCES SUBJECT TO TESTNG. Testing shall be
permitted only for the following substances:
[to be supplied by the legislature]
COMMENT

The decision regarding which substances are to be tested
should be made by the legislature, not the overseeing administrative agency. Individual legislatures, however, may choose to
identify different substances that can impair workers in the
employment setting.
The consensus of the Task Force was that alcohol abuse is a
substantially greater workplace problem than drug abuse, and
that alcohol should be among the substances for which testing is
authorized. If employers choose to implement a testing program,
testing for alcohol abuse should be part of the program.
(b) REQUIREMENT OF USE OF DESIGNATED LABORATORY. An employer maintaining a testing program shall adopt
testing procedures that are performed only by laboratoriesdesignated by the Department.1
COMMENT

The variation in qualitative procedures offered by drug-testing
laboratories is a serious problem in the United States. Some
laboratories operate at the highest level of efficiency and quali1. Throughout the Act the term "Department' is used to refer to the appropriate state
or federal agency designated by the legislature to administer the Act.
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tative maintenance while others have significant error rates. The
only way to ensure uniform high quality practices is to mandate
that an appropriate governmental agency adopt rules for designating substance abuse testing laboratories and direct that no
employment testing program may function without the use of
such designated laboratories.
(c) SPECIMEN COLLECTION PROCEDURES.All testing pursuant to this Act must follow specimen collection procedures established by the Department.
SECTIoN

3. ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMiAKING.

The Department shall develop rules to effectuate the purposes of
this Act. At a minimum the rules must address three areas:
(a) CERTIFICATION OF LABORATORIES. The Department
shall adopt rules regardingthe certificationof laboratoriesand the
development of specifw testing procedures. The Department shall
certify those laboratories that have satisfied these requirements.
The rules shall be designed to ensure the highest quality laboratory
practices. The rules -must include standards that are at least as
rigorous as the standards and practices of national accrediting
agencies in the field. The Department shall review these rules on
an annual basis and modify them as necessary. The Department's
rules shall address at least the following:
(1) credentials and training of laboratorypersonnel;
(2) types of screening and confirmatory tests required;
(3) procedures as to maintenance of confidentiality;
(4) quality control;
(5) avoidance of tampering with samples;
(6) chain of custody;
(7) specimen retention;
(8) threshold detection levels for purposes of determining
positive test results;
(9) proceduresfor identifying and maintainingtest samples
and records; and
(10) methods of reporting results.
COMMENT

The rules to be adopted by the agency shall establish standards
for the credentials and training of laboratory employees and the
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testing of identified substances in order to guarantee that high
quality practices are used. These rules must meet or exceed
standards established by national accrediting agencies such as
the National Institute for Drug Abuse. The rules should be
specific regarding the certification of testing procedures that
promote and maintain high quality practices with respect to
particular types of testing, confidentiality, maintenance of test
results, retention of records and specimens, and establishment of
threshold detection levels. The government shall publish a list
identifying laboratories that satisfy the standards.
(b) SPECIMEN COLLECTION. The Department shall adopt
rules regardingthe process of specimen collection, so as to promote
accuracy in the process and preserve individual privacy, dignity,
and confidentiality to the maximum extent practicable.
COMMENT

The potential for abuse of individual privacy and dignity in
the specimen collection process is of genuine concern. The appropriate agency, therefore, must develop rules regarding collection, giving particular attention to this concern.
(c) REVIEW OFFICERS. The Department shall adopt standards as to the qualifications and training of Review Officers.
COMMENT

Because the Act requires the involvement of Review Officers
(section 4(c)), standards must be set to determine the particular
experience and training needed.
SECTION

4. TESTING SAFEGUARDS.

(a) CONFIRMATION OF POSITIVE TEST RESULTS. No disciplinary actions may be taken by an employer againstan employee
or an applicant based on a positive substance abuse test result
unless:
(1) the test result has been confirmed by a second test of
that sample meeting the level of sophistication required
by the Department;
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(2) the employee or applicanthas been informed in writing
of the opportunity to explain, in confidence, the positive,
confirmed test result; and
(8) the employee or applicanthas been given the test results
and been notified of the right, at the employee's own
ex pense, to secure, within seven days of receipt of the
notice and results, an independent analysis of that sample by another certified laboratory.
If the employee exercises the right to secure an independent analysis
of the sample by another certified laboratory, and if the results of
that analysis contradict the results obtained from the employer's
second confirmed test, the employee's certified laboratory and the
employer's certified laboratory shall submit the sample to a third
mutually acceptable certified laboratory, which shall make a final
determination.
COMMENT

Confirmation of positive test results is essential to the maintenance of a high quality testing program. As a result of problems
with accuracy in testing, no disciplinary employment actions
(whether discharge, suspension, failure to hire, or any other such
action) may be taken unless a positive test of the same sample
is confirmed by a second test meeting the agency's requirements.
In the majority of cases, the second test will be more sophisticated than the first, but it is not the intent here to approve
inferior tests at the screening stage. In addition, to limit error
with respect to such problems as food consumed by the individual
or the use of lawful drugs, an employee or applicant who tests
positive must be given the opportunity to explain the positive
test results and the right to have an independent confirmation
of-the same sample by another laboratory. In the event that the
employer's and employee's certified laboratories make contradictory determinations, a "tie-breaker" mechanism is provided, in
which the sample is submitted to a third certified laboratory.
It should be noted that some members of the Task Force
believed that if a specimen is positive, the employee or applicant
should have the right to provide a fresh specimen because of the
possibility of mislabeling of specimens. According to this view,
if that test turned out to be negative, an employee or applicant
could not be disciplined or refused employment but would have
to agree to a given number of unannounced tests during the
following year of employment.
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(b) INTERIM SAFETY TRANSFERS. Nothing in this section
shall prevent a nondisciplinary transfer of an employee for precautionary safety purposes, with no reduction in pay, to another
job duty, pending the completion of all procedures provided for in
section 4(a).
COMMENT

While the employer may not discipline solely on the basis of
the initial test result, he or she may immediately transfer the
employee for safety considerations.
(c) CONFIDENTIALITY. Substance abuse testing results shall
be kept private and confidential. These results may be disclosed
only to:
(1) the tested employee or applicant, or such other person
designated, in writing, by that employee or applicant;
(2) a Review Officer designated by the employer to receive
and evaluate test results and hear the explanation of the
employee or applicant;
(S) the employer, if the designatedReview Officer determines
that the test is positive and confirmed, and t4at no
adequate explanationof the positive confirmed result has
been forthcomingfrom the employee or applicant;and
(4) an arbitratoror mediator, a court, or a governmental
agency as othemse authorized by state orfederal law.
COMMENT

General agreement exists concerning the need to maintain
privacy and confidentiality in the testing process. Accordingly,
there is a strong restriction against making public the results of
testing. The only exceptions to the confidentiality rule are tailored narrowly to coincide with the interests of both the employee
and the employer and to comply with applicable provisions of
state or federal law.
The debate within the Task Force on disclosure to the employer
was intense. Most members believed that disclosure to the employer should be permitted only if the results first receive the
scrutiny of a Review Officer. Under the Act, the testing information is transmitted to the Review Officer who will turn over
the information to the employei only if the Review Officer believes the positive confirmed result indicates illegal use of drugs
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or alcohol abuse and is not persuaded as to any legitimate
explanation for the result. The Review Officer may be a medical
officer or other qualified person. The phrase "other qualified
person" is intended to permit small businesses, which may not
have the resources to hire a medical officer, to designate a person
within the business to evaluate test results. The administrative
agency shall promulgate instructional material sufficient to train
such a designated person in making a qualified evaluation.
(d) ACCESS TO RECORDS. The tested employee or applicant
shall have a right of access to all records that pertain to the testing
of that individual, subject to the maintenance of confidentialityfor
other individuals.
COMMENT

It is vital that individuals who are tested be given all records
concerning their testing. Such information may correct errors
and assist in the prompt resolution of questions arising under
the Act.
(e) EMPLOYEE SANCTIONS. No employee may be discharged
or suspended for more than 30 calendar days on the basis of the
employee receiving for the first time a positive, confijrmed result
to the substance abuse test. This section shall not apply to discharges
or suspensions for more than 30 calendar days based on grounds
independent of a test result.
COMMENT

This section gives the employer the right to transfer or suspend
an employee immediately based on a single positive, confirmed
substance abuse test result. An employer may not, however,
terminate an employee or suspend the employee for longer than
30 calendar days for a confirmed first offense. This section merely
prohibits dismissal or suspension beyond 30 days based on a
positive, confirmed test alone. When an employer has grounds
independent of a test result that would justify discharge or a
longer suspension, this section would not apply. The employer
may undertake appropriate actions based upon such independent
grounds.
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5. EDUCATION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS.

No substance abuse testing program may be developed unless the
employer has taken steps to educate employees about the dangers
associated with substance abuse. In addition, the employer must
have the capacity to refer individuals to programs that treat,
rehabilitate,or counsel those who use illegal drugs or misuse legal
drugs, including alcohol. Participationin such programs may be
at the employee's own expense unless otherwise provided in a
collective bargaining agreement, in coverage under an employee
benefit program, in the employment agreement, or by law.
COMMENT

It is appropriate to require the establishment of an education
program concerning the dangers associated with substance abuse.
The specific nature and limits of that program remain to be
worked out in the employment setting. There has been considerable debate, however, on whether treatment programs should
be required in connection .with the establishment of an employment testing program. Some states require the establishment of
treatment programs, but ultimately such a requirement is rejected in this Act. The data in support of the success rate of
treatment programs are limited and individual employees may
not need a treatment program in order to comply with the policy
rationale for the Act. The employer is required to be able to
refer employees to rehabilitation, treatment, or counseling programs but is not forced to make such referrals.
SECTION

6.

THE PERMISSIBLE BASES FOR DRUG AND ALCOHOL

TESTING.

Testing conducted pursuant to the requirements and procedures
of this Act is permissible in only five situations: (a)testing for
cause, (b) random testing, (c) testing after prior use, (d) post-accident testing, and (e) applicant testing.
COMMENT

Section 6 contains the substantive core of this legislation. The
statute prohibits all forms of drug and alcohol testing in the
workplace unless the testing falls within one of the five categories
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that are set forth with specificity in section 6(a), (b), (c), (d), and
(e).
(a) TESTING FOR CAUSE. An employee may be required to
undergo substance abuse testing if reasonable suspicion exists to
believe that such individual is currently under the influence of
drugs or alcohol and such influence could adversely affect job
performance or the work environment.
COMMENT

While some individuals have raised questions as to the propriety and efficacy of individualized suspicion testing, such testing
is appropriate if a fair degree of individual suspicion exists to
believe that the employee is presently under the influence of
drugs or alcohol. Reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of
absolute certainty: "sufficient probability, not certainty is the
touchstone of reasonableness." "Reasonable suspicion" has been
defined by the Supreme Court as a less demanding standard than
probable cause.
The testing here would be restricted to those situations in
which individuals appear to be under the influence and such
influence could adversely affect job performance or the work
environment. The Task Force members assumed that in order to
avoid liability questions, employers would be encouraged to develop training programs for personnel who will supervise the
gathering of information in the for-cause testing area.
(b) RANDOM TESTING. Employees, or groups of employees,
may be required to undergo substance abuse testing on a random
or chance basis when no individualized suspicion is present in the
following situations:
COMMENT

Random or chance testing will not be allowed for all employees
routinely, nor for all employees undergoing periodically scheduled
physical examinations. Instead, such random or chance testing
will be permitted only in the three situations presented here
which can be justified as linked to employment safety and, in
narrowly defined positions, workplace integrity.
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(1) The employees occupy a category or classificationwhose
duties are such that if any employee is impaired by
drug or alcohol use, an injury to the public may occur
which will involve catastrophicresults.
COMMENT

Random or chance testing would be permitted under this
section even in employment classifications or categories where
there is a low probability that individuals would come to work
impaired by substance abuse. The testing is permitted, however,
because even if the likelihood of use is not great and a causal
relationship between such use and injury to the public has not
been shown, the magnitude of the harm is so grievous that
random testing would be appropriate. This form of random testing would be limited to extremely serious safety concerns involving workers such as nuclear power plant supervisors,
commercial airline pilots, or others who directly operate or control some form of mass transportation. Some statutes refer to
random testing of individuals in "safety sensitive" positions. The
Task Force rejected this formulation as being overbroad because
almost any job in some situations might involve safety concerns.
The term "catastrophic results" is intended to convey the notion
that this is to be a narrow category involving workers in extremely dangerous areas.
(2) The employees work in a plant, facility, or operating
unit as to which there is a high probability, based on
evidence of drug use or distributionin the plant,facility,
or operating unit within the past 3 months, that a
significant number of the employees in such a plant,
facility, or operating unit have come to work impaired,
and because of such impairment physical injury may
occur to those employees or other employees or the public.
COMMENT

The basis for testing here is not linked to the great magnitude
of the harm as in section 6(b)(1). It is based upon evidence of
significant drug use in a particular plant, facility, or operating
unit. This evidence would have to be particularized and limited
to the specific employer's own experience with the plant, facility
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or operating unit, rather than industrywide experiences and
findings.
(3) The employees occupy a position that involves activities
directly connected to the interdiction or detection of
illegal drugs or the punishment or treatment of users of
illegal drugs.
COMMENT

While concern has been expressed as to individual rights of
personnel involved in the illegal drug area, a special random
testing category is appropriate here due to the strong public
interest in eliminating drug use in this area. An especially high
public interest exists in deterring corruption and dishonesty in
employment positions directly connected to unlawful drug interdiction or detection, and punishment or treatment of illegal drug
users. Moreover, substance abuse by individuals in these positions
is especially likely to compromise job performance. To preserve
the integrity of, and enhance public confidence in, workers charged
with these responsibilities, random testing is permitted.
(c) TESTING AFTER PRIOR USE. Employees or applicants
who have received a confirmed positive test result within the past
year may be required to submit to testing at reasonable intervals
for a period of one year following the test result or one year
following their return to, or commencement of, work, whichever
comes later.
COMMENT

The employer has the right to feel confident that a worker
returning to work after a positive test result is now drug-free.
Similarly, an employer hiring an applicant who has earlier tested
positive should be able to assume no further drug use has
occurred. In this setting, therefore, testing without individual
suspicion is allowed. The section establishes a one-year time limit
for such tests and dictates that the testing may occur only at
reasonable intervals.
(d) TESTING AFTER AN ACCIDENT. Employees may be required to undergo substance abuse testing if the test is taken
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immediately after an accident involving serious injury and the test

is made of employees whose performance the employer reasonably
believes may have caused the accident.
COMMENT

Testing of employees who may have caused an accident involving serious injury is justified. Such testing is permitted,
however, only when there is a possible causal connection between
drug use and the accident. Train employees, for example, could
not be tested after an accident caused by a bridge collapse.
Similarly, only workers who may have been responsible for the
accident may be tested. Thus, in a rail crash the engineer normally could be tested, but the porter normally could not be
tested.
(e) APPLICANTS FOR EMPLOYMENT.
[Alternative A.]
The employer may require an applicantfor initial hire to be
tested, as a condition of employment, once the employer has determined that the applicantis otherwise qualified for hire.
[Alternative B.]
The employer may require an applicantfor initial hire to be
tested, as a condition of employment, only in those situations in
which testing would be permitted under this Act if the applicant
were already an employee.
COMMENT

All members of the Task Force agreed that some testing of
applicants should be permitted. There was disagreement, however, over which applicants should be tested. Many of the members of the Task Force concluded that applicant testing should
be allowed as a condition of employment for initial hire. Alternative A of the Act does not permit testing of any applicant who
"walks in the door," but only of those applicants who are serious
candidates for hire. Under Alternative A, however, any qualified
applicant may be tested before the applicant acquires the legal
status of an employee.
Several reasons support Alternative A. First, the applicant has
no legally vested interest in privacy vis-i-vis the employer prior
to the establishment of a work relationship with the employer.
Second, the applicant's unilateral expectations of privacy are
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diminished when the applicant is given notice, at the time of the
application, of the employer's applicant testing program. A potential applicant given such notice may choose not to apply for
the position at all, or to avoid using forbidden drugs prior to the
application. Finally, an employer should be permitted to screen
applicants for drug problems prior to undertaking the potential
legal and financial disabilities attendant to substance abuse.
Many other members of the Task Force urged adoption of
Alternative B. Under Alternative B, some applicants may be
tested, but only if they would be subject to testing if they were
already employees. For example, a job applicant for a position
as a nuclear power plant operator could be tested, because such
a person would be subject to random testing under section 6(b)(1)
of this Act.
Several reasons support their view. First, the privacy interest
of the applicant is the same as that of the employee; the invasion
is no greater if a work relationship exists. Second, the notice
given does not eliminate the individual's expectation of privacy,
it simply establishes an inappropriate condition of employment.
Finally, while the employer's economic concern may be legitimate,
the social interest in protecting privacy justifies the placement
of this risk on the employer as a cost of doing business.
Some members suggested a compromise position. They believed that applicant testing should be allowed only as part of a
pre-employment physical examination. This alternative was regarded as less intrusive of privacy interests, because it is incident
to the already intrusive physical examination. Furthermore, it
permits the employer, by undertaking to pay for the costs of the
examination, to reduce substantially the potential financial and
legal risks associated with hiring an applicant with substance
abuse problems.
Once the applicant is included in the testing program, all
protections under the Act (notice, required procedures, etc.) come
into force.
SECTION

7. WAIVER.

The rights and procedures provided by this statute may not be
waived by contract or otherwise unless such waiver is part of a
written settlement to an action brought under this Act and is
agreed to and signed by the parties.
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COMMENT

This Act provides important protection to individuals and
reflects society's strong interest in regulating substance abuse
testing in the employment setting. Hence, waiver of these rights
would be inappropriate and is not allowed. The one exception is
when an individual has brought a cause of action under this Act
and the individual makes a knowing waiver of his or her statutory
rights as part of a settlement of the litigation.
SECTION

8. REMEDIES.

(a) CIVIL ACTIONS. The attorney general, an employee, an
applicant, or any other aggrieved person may bring a civil action
in any court of competent jurisdictionfor such legal or equitable
relief as will effectuate the purposes of this Act. Such an action
may be brought against an employer, a laboratory,a governmental
agency, or any other person alleged to have violated the provisions
of this Act.
COMMENT

Existing drug-testing legislation often fails to include adequate
remedies. This section creates a civil action for aggrieved persons.
The Act does not provide for any administrative agency clearance
of a drug-testing program at the "front-end" of the implementation of the program. This section, however, permits the attorney
general to bring actions to ensure compliance with, and effectuate
the purposes of, the Act.
(b) AUTHORIZED RELIEF.A prevailingparty shall be awarded
declaratory or injunctive relief, or compensatory damages, as appropriate.Such relief may include, but is not limited to, employment, reinstatement,promotion, and the payment of lost wages and
benefits. A governmental entity shall be subject to declaratory or
injunctive relief and when acting as an employer, shall also be
liable for compensatory damages, the same as a private entity.
COMMENT

This section should be read in conjunction with section 8(c),
which provides for liquidated damages in cases of knowing or
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reckless violations, and with section 8(d), permitting reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs for prevailing plaintiffs. This section
also makes clear that considerations of sovereign immunity shall
not immunize the government from liability under the Act. The
government is always subject to declaratory or injunctive relief
under the Act. In addition, when the government acts in its
capacity as an employer, this section specifically authorizes the
same relief applicable to private entities, including compensatory
damages.
(q) DAMAGES FOR KNTOWING OR RECKLESS VIOLATIONS. If a person knowingly or recklessly violates the provisions
of this Act, damages may be awarded in the amount of two times
compensatory damages.
COMMENT

To deter the knowing or reckless violation of the Act, damages
of two times compensatory damages are authorized.
(d) ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS. In any action brought
pursuant to this Act, the court may award reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs to any prevailing plaintiff. A governmental entity
shall be liablefor such fees and costs the same as a private person.
COMMENT

This section, permitting the award of reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs, reflects the strong public
interest in the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. Once
again, this section rejects any governmental exemption based on
considerations of sovereign immunity.
(e) OTHER RIGHTS AND REMEDIES. The rights and remedies provided in this Act are in addition to, and not in lieu of,
any other contractual or statutory rights and remedies accorded
to employees and applicants, and are not intended to alter or affect
such contractual or statutory rights and remedies. No cause of
action arising from employment-related drug-testing, other than
the contractual or statutory causes of action preserved in this
section, and the causes of action created by this Act, may be
maintained.The remedies provided in this Act shall be the exclusive
remedies for violation of this Act.
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COMMENT

This section deals with the difficult problem of the relationship
of the rights and remedies of this Act to other legal causes of
action. The Act does not preempt any other contractual or statutory causes of action. Apart from the contractual and statutory
causes of action preserved in this section, however, the Act does
preempt any other cause of action arising from employmentrelated drug-testing, including specifically the remedies provided
at common law. The remedies provided in this Act are the
exclusive remedies for violation of the Act.
() LIMITATIONS PERIOD. An action arising under this Act
must be commenced within one year of the date on which the alleged
violation of the Act occurred.
COMMENT

The one-year limitations period in this section is intended to
incorporate by reference the general limitations principles of the
jurisdiction, including principles governing such issues as discovery and notice of violations, and the tolling of limitations periods.
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COMMENTS BY MEMBERS
Paul Marcus is Professor of Law and former Dean of the University of Arizona College of Law. He is a distinguished national
scholar with expertise in, among other areas, criminal law. He is
Chair of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law's Task Force on the
Drug-Free Workplace.
Mr. Marcus received his A.B. degree, cum laude, from UCLA
and his J.D. from UCLA School of Law, where he was articles
editor of the UCLA Law Review and a member of the Order of
the Coif. Mr. Marcus' publications include, among others: Nimmer,
Copyright and Other Aspects of Law Pertaining to Literary, Musical and Artistic Works (with D. Myers and D. Nimmer; 4th ed.
West Publishing, 1990), The Law of Entrapment (Michie & Co.,
1989; Supplement, 1990), The Prosecutionand Defense of Criminal
Conspiracy Cases (Matthew Bender & Co., 1978, revised, 1985,
1989; Annual Supplements 1979-1990), CriminalProcedure: Cases
and Materials (with J. Cook; Matthew Bender & Co., 1981, 2nd
Edition, 1986, Annual Supplements 1982-1989), and, CriminalLaw:
Cases and Materials (with J. Cook; Matthew Bender & Co., 1982,
2nd Edition, 1988).
Formore than a year this Task Force attempted to come to grips
with the very serious questions which confront any observer analyzing the phenomenon of substance abuse testing in the workplace
in the United States. The focus was on the preservationof individual privacy and dignity, on legitimate concerns of safety and
liability. The Task Force attempted to balance the not always
harmonious interests of employers, employees, and the public. The
plan offered in this report is a thoughtful and sensitive approach
to both the broad policy matters and the quite specific procedural
questions which arise in connection with the debate over drugtesting.
The members of the Task Force worked diligently, sometimes
agreeingwith one another, often times disagreeing.The end product
is, in my judgment, worthy of serious legislative consideration and
debate as we look to the problems our country faces in the area of
substance abuse.
Rodney A. Smolla is the Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law and
Director of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the College of
William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
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He is a graduate of Yale College and of the Duke Law School,
and he clerked for Chief Judge Charles Clark of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. His books include:
Suing the Press: Libel, the Media, and Power (Oxford University
Press, 1986), Law of Defamation (Clark Boardman Publishing Co.,
1986), Jerry Falwell v. Larry Flynt: The First Amendment on
Trial (St. Martin's Press, 1988), and ConstitutionalLaw: Structure
and Rights in Our Federal System (with Daan Braveman and
William C. Banks) (Matthew Bender Pub. Col. 1991). His latest
book, Free Speech in an Open Society, will be published in 1992
by Alfred A. Knopf.
I wear two hats in relation to this report. As the Director of the
Institute of Bill of Rights Law, I was, in a sense, the "executive
producer" of this enterprise, with a vested interest in coaxing the
process along and encouragingthe participantsto keep their minds
open, as this very diverse group sought consensus on the many
difficult policy conflicts posed by drug-testing in the workplace. As
an active participantin the Task Force, however, I was an actual
actor in the drama, caught up in the give and take of intense
debate. I look back at the whole process now with a great measure
of pride. I am proud of the Institute, for taking on an issue such
as this, and for going about this project in a manner calculated to
have a positive and concrete influence on the evolution of public
policy. And I am proud of my colleagues on the Task Force, for
their energy, imagination, and selfless public service.
James J. Brudney is Chief Counsel and Staff Director for the
United States Senate Subcommittee on Labor chaired by Senator
Howard Metzenbaum. He is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C.
Mr. Brudney received his B.A. degree, summa cum laude, from
Amherst College, graduating Phi Beta Kappa, and his J.D. degree
from Yale Law School, where he was an editor of the Yale Law
Journal. He also has a degree in philosophy and politics from
Oxford University. After law school, Mr. Brudney served as a
law clerk to United States District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell and
to United States Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun.
After clerking for Justice Blackmun, he spent four years at the
firm of Bredhoff & Kaiser in Washington, D.C. and has been with
the Senate Subcommittee on Labor since 1985.
With one notable exception, I believe that the Task Force has
done a reasonablejob in a difficult area: balancing the interests of
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employers and the needs of the public against the privacy rights of
individual Americans.
The exception involves the testing of applicants. I am prepared
to allow applicant testing on the same basis as we permit testing
of employees (e.g., for cause, after prior use, or for positions of
extreme public safety sensitivity). But I do not believe we should
allow testing of applicants under a lesser standard, and certainly
not in the absence of any standard at all.
One hardly needs the Report to appreciate that being tested for
drugs constitutes a significant invasion of privacy. Chemical analysis of urine may disclose a wide range of private medical facts
about an individual. Moreover, the process of collecting the sample
generally involves close monitoring of a highly personal act.
This invasion of privacy is as serious for an individual who
applies for a job as it is for one who already holds the position.
Absent evidence of prior use or individualized suspicion, there
simply is no reason to allow testing of men and women just because
they aspire to hold jobs as office secretaries, gravediggers, architects, or computer technicians. Once the market produces less
expensive screening methods, allowing unrestricted applicant testing would invite an assault on the privacy of virtually every adult
in the country. Such a step is both drastic and unwarranted.
Craig M Cornish practices law with the firm of Cornish &
Dell'Olio in Colorado Springs, Colorado. His practice consists
mainly of civil rights and employment litigation. Mr. Cornish is
the author of a book on employee drug-testing, Drugs and Alcohol
in the Workplace: Testing and Privacy, and is listed in the latest
edition of Best Lawyers in America under the category of Employment Law - Individual.
Mr. Cornish is a graduate of Creighton University and of
Washburn University Law School. He is a member of the bars
of the State of Alaska, Colorado, and Kansas and of the District
of Columbia. He currently serves as plaintiff co-chair of the
American Bar Associations's Employee Privacy and Collateral
Torts Sub-Committee of the Employee Rights and Responsibilities
Committee.
I believe mass drug-testing will be effective in reducing illegal
drug use among persons who are involved in the workforce, and
thus, will make a significant contribution to the War on Drugs.
However, nothing is free. The means used in employment drugtesting will be costly and may transform society in several ways.
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First,mass drug-testing has already resulted in the United States
Supreme Court'ssanction of systematic preventive searches-searches
aimed at groups and intended primarilyto deter wrongful behavior.
Preventive searches essentially make an end-run around the Fourth
Amendment because they do not require a search warrant,probable
cause or even individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. By their
systematic nature, the role of a neutral magistrate is displaced by
a legislature, administrative agency or human relations department.
Second, mass drug-testing has resulted in the systematic biochemical search of millions of individualsfor the purpose of monitoring
and regulating off-duty behavior. Our acceptance of mass biochemical testing for illegal drugs will pave the way for new biochemical
searches to regulate employee health and to discriminate against
persons with certain genetic traits.
Third, mass drug-testing has shown employers how they can
learn more about individuals through systematic toxicological testing, such as whether women are pregnant and what prescription
medications employees are taking, which in turn discloses what
illnesses or diseases they may have hidden from employers. This
will necessarily increase employers' appetitesfor more biochemical
information-aboutapplicants and employees in order to make more
group-basedpredictive judgments in screening employees.
Fourth, the efficacy of economic sanctions to induce abstinence
from illegal drug use will spawn the conditioning of other basic
needs, such as education, housing, licenses, or even medical care,
upon conformity to a behavioralprofile.
Fifth, by enlisting the private sector in regulating off-duty behavior of applicants and employees, the government's model of
privatizinggovernment surveillance and punishmentfunctions will
partially succeed in evading constitutional restraints on the coercive powers of society.
Sixth, as mass drug-testing is presently conducted, it has made
a mockery of the presumption of innocence and created a suspect
in every individual who is not willing to submit to a biochemical
test of his or her blood or urine.
Finally, by.submitting millions of Americans to systematic biochemical surveillance of their blood or urine, our level of expectations of individual privacy will greatly diminish, and we will,
thereby, surrendera considerable amount of autonomy, dignity and
sovereignty. We have allowed the government and employers to
transcend an invisible shield which stood at the edge of our bodies.
This line is now crumbling like the Berlin Wall. John Stuart Mill's
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aphorism, "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign," no longer sounds relevant.
Michael R. Gottfredson is Professor of Management and Policy
and of Psychology, and Head of the Department of Management
and Policy at the University of Arizona. His areas of expertise
include criminology, delinquency, crime and public policy, statistics, and the criminal justice system.
Dr. Gottfredson received an A.B. from the University of California at Davis and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the State University
of New York at Albany. He is the author of numerous articles
and books on criminology and the criminal justice system, including A General Theory of Crime (with Travis Hirschi; Stanford
University Press, 1990), Decisionmaking in Criminal Justice:
Toward the RationalExercise of Discretion(with Don Gottfredson;
revised edition, New York: Plenum, 1988), and Positive Criminology (with Hirschi; Newbury Park: Sage, 1985). He has served
as Director of the Criminal Justice Center in Albany, New York.
The American public is greatly concerned about illegal drug use,
a concern that has generated enormous expenditures for law enforcement, has greatly increased rates of imprisonment, and has
enhanced federal involvement in state and local criminal justice
systems. Drug-testing in the workplace is, of course, another manifestation of this public concern. But unlike the expanded efforts to
combat drugs through the criminal justice system, with its established rules of procedure, the effort to test bodilyfluids of employees
and job applicants seeks to use private citizens and their businesses
to reduce the incidence of drug use by threatening the loss of
employment and reputation. The public popularity of these programs, and the zeal with which many sponsors of the programs
advocate them, caution us to look hard at the deprivations that
they may cause citizens and to design strong protections against
unwarrantedintrusions.In my view, such programs are irrelevant
to the fight against illegal drug use, are financially unwise for
most businesses, and are an especially unseemly invasion of personal privacy. I believe that the model statute is an exceptionally
well-crafted document that balances such concerns against the reality of widespread, and largely unregulated, workplace drugtesting.
R. Claire Guthrie is Deputy Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia. She is a graduate of Michigan State University
and of the University of Virginia School of Law.
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Prior to assuming her present position, Ms. Guthrie was in
private practice in Washington, D.C., was University Counsel and
Assistant Secretary of Princeton University, and was a staff
attorney for the Civil Rights Division of the Office of General
Counsel with the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. She also served as interim president of Chatham College
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
The Task Force's ultimate recommendations reflect, in part, the
public's schizophrenia about the subject of drug-testing. While the
Task Force recommendationsrestrict testing to situations in which
performance in the workplace would be affected, it sets up a system
in which employers would be prohibitedfrom testing workers for
many substances, including alcohol, which while not illegal can
adversely affect performance. Legislatures, not employers, are left
with the task of defining which substances may be the subject of
testing. Prescriptionmedications and alcohol may well be left off
the statutory list.
The consequence of this is that the drug-testing program that an
employer may be permitted to implement will address only "street
drugs." Such a program, in my view, ultimately becomes no more
than an extension of law enforcement, an outcome I think a majority
of this Task Force thought it was trying to avoid. Moreover, the
limitation of random testing to narrowly defined safety and law
enforcement situations means all routine testing of professional
athletes for performance enhancing or detracting drugs would be
barred.Such testing is obviously work-related.Its prohibitiondefies
common sense.
The fundamental questions here are "is drug-testing justified
and, if so, why?" The Task Force said yes, but like the public, it
couldn't really agree why.
Jonathan V. Holtzman is Special Assistant to the City Attorney
for the City and County of San Francisco and, as such, serves as
the chief labor and employment attorney for the city. In that
capacity, Mr. Holtzman has been instrumental in fashioning the
city's drug-related policies.
Mr. Holtzman received his B.A. degree from Haverford College,
where he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and his J.D. from
Stanford Law School. After law school, he clerked for Justice
Otto Kaus of the California Supreme Court and practiced law in
the San Francisco area, with a focus on employment litigation.
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The Task Force Report is the product of a challenging, sometimes
animated debate. I am delighted with the result. The Report recognizes the compelling nature of employees' privacy interests, and
that drug testing constitutes a significant invasion of privacy. The
Task Force's limitations on random testing and procedural rules
are well considered, strike a fair balance, and should serve as a
model for future legislation.
I remain troubled in two significant areas. First, while the
Report correctly recognizes that safety concerns can be compelling,
it is less clear that such compelling concerns actually motivate
employers to use random testing. Many employers claim to base
their testing on safety concerns, but do not requireperiodic physical
examinations, do not test for alcohol or legal drug use, and do not
examine their equipment nearly as closely as their employees. If
employees are required to leave theirprivacy rights at the workplace
door, they are entitled to receive something of equal value on the
other side-an ultra-safe workplace. I would not permit random or
across-the-boardtesting unless an employer, based on the totality
of circumstances, could demonstrate a comprehensive scheme designed to prevent life-threatening accidents.
Second, I fail to see any justification for the alternative of
permitting across-the-boardtesting of job applicants while limiting
the testing of incumbent employees.
The public will to battle drugs is strong. But the precedent of
using the workplace to foster the goals of law enforcement is
dangerous. In bending to the public will and establishing this
precedent, we can only hope that it will not become a road map
for other forms of biochemical surveillance by employers.
Dr. Donald B. Louria is Chairman of Preventive Medicine and
Community Health at the University of Medicine and Dentistry
of New Jersey-New Jersey Medical School. He is one of the
leading medical scholars and public health experts in the United
States.
Dr. Louria is a graduate of Harvard University and of the
Harvard Medical School. He has written extensively on matters
relating to drug and alcohol abuse, including three books on the
subject: Nightmare Drugs (in association with This Week Magazine; Pocket Books, Inc. New York, 1966), The DrugScene (McGrawHill Book Co., New York, 1968), and Overcoming Drugs: A Program for Action (McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1971).
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At about the half-way point of our first meeting there seemed to
be no possibility that a proposalfor a model bill could be formulated
by 16 people from such divergent backgrounds, with such different
perceptions about the problem of workplace drug abuse. By the end
of the first meeting we had stripped away the arguments about the
testing that on careful analysis could not be sustained. Thereafter,
it became clear that the proposed bill would have to satisfy those
on the one hand who felt that the paramount issues related to
employer rights to a drug-free workplace as well as society's obligatory firm response to the drug abuse epidemic; and on the other
hand those whose concerns related primarily to protection of the
rights to privacy of the employee. The latter group contained those
who visualized drug-testing as possibly the vanguard of a whole
new series of biochemical and genetic tests that will be developed
over a period of decades that, if misused, could undercut severely
the individualfreedoms that are the bedrock of a democratic society.
Under the skillful prodding of Rodney Smolla and Paul Marcus,
I believe we have formulated a very good bill that will be helpful
in society's battle against drug abuse, recognize the rights of employers, reduce the danger to the public and the working population
from workplace accidents due to drug abuse, and yet, simultaneously, limit the testing so as to protect individual workers against
inordinately intrusive examinations. This careful balancing act
that helps a given workplace problem and still protects the individual should serve our society well as a prototype when, in the future,
technological advances make it possible by body fluid analysis to
determine in great detail and to place in computer banks the
biochemical and genetic makeup of any individual.
Judge Prentice H. Marshall is Senior Judge of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Since his
appointment in 1973, Judge Marshall has had an illustrious career
on the federal bench.
He received his undergraduate and law degrees from the
University of Illinois. Prior to his appointment to the bench,
Judge Marshall was a distinguished lawyer in Chicago and a
professor of law at the University of Illinois, the University of
Chicago, and Harvard University.
All wars produce more collateral casualties than combatant casualties. The war on drugs is no exception. Principalamong the
casualties has been the loss of personal dignity. From childhood we
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are taught that urination is an act which should be performed in
private. As a consequence of the war on drugs, huge numbers of
persons are told they must urinate in the presence of a stranger
in order to obtain or retain a job.
The Fourth Amendment provides an ever dwindling modicum of
protection to the government applicant/employee. But the private
sector applicant/employee enjoys no protection under the federal
Constitution or legislation and very little under the constitutions
and laws of the several states. Organized labor has made a none
too successful effort through collective bargainingcontracts but they
do not reach the job applicant and provide no protection to those
millions of private sector applicants/employees who do not work in
union affiliated employment.
This proposed Act will, if adopted and enforced, staunch the flow
of collateral casualties. Furthermore, it recognizes that the causes
of the use of mood altering drugs are the root of the evil and
requires that we do something about them.
Alan C. Page is Assistant Attorney General for the State of
Minnesota assigned to the Employment Law Division. In that
capacity, he has primary responsibility for providing client advice
interpreting the State's statute on drug-testing.
Mr. Page is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame and
of the University of Minnesota Law School. Prior to joining the
Minnesota Attorney General's staff, he was in private practice.
Mr. Page also had an outstanding fifteen-year career as a professional football player with both the Minnesota Vikings and the
Chicago Bears. He served as a players' representative and as a
member of the Executive Committee for the National Football
League Player's Association. In 1971 he became the first defensive player in the history of the NFL to receive the Most Valuable
Player Award, and he was inducted into the Pro Football Hall
of Fame in 1988.
Over the past ten years, workplace drug and alcohol testing has
become a common weapon in the war on drugs. Such testing has
taken on the characteristics of a giant steamroller picking up
momentum that flattens everything in its course whether necessary
or not. I am philosophicallyopposed to workplace drug and alcohol
testing. That opposition is rooted in the belief that simply because
an individual seeks to obtain or maintain employment, the individual should not be required to choose between a loss of his or her
right to privacy and the opportunity to work. A person should not
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be required to share the content of his or her urine with strangers.
My opposition is also based on the belief that testing for drugs and
alcohol in the workplace will not result in victory in the "war on
drugs." The substance abuse problems that we have as a society
are far too complex to be solved by simple solutions. Especially
where the simple solutions are not necessarily directed at the source
of the problems. Finally, one must ask the question: where are the
limits on workplace biochemical testing? Today the issue is workplace drug and alcohol testing. Tomorrow it will be testing for
communicable diseases and genetic defects. These questions raise
the issue of where an employer's legitimate interests lie.
Even though I am philosophicallyopposed to workplace drug and
alcohol testing, I have concluded that legislation regulating such
testing is absolutely necessary. It is necessary because without such
legislation the legitimate interests of employees and job applicants
relating to privacy, confidentiality, reliability, andfairness would
be left unprotected from the drug-testing steamroller. The fact is
that in both the public and private sectors workplace drug and
alcohol testing is here to stay. The U.S. Supreme Court has made
clear that under certain circumstances drug and alcohol testing is
permissible in the public sector. There is no reason to believe that
the Court would treat private sector workplace biochemical testing
any differently. Currently, the only protection available to most
employees is to be found in common law tort and contract law.
The protections afforded by the common law are not adequate to
protect employee rights in this instance. Thus, legislation which
protects the legitimate interests of employees and job applicants is
necessary. The Substance Abuse Testing Act as proposed by the
Task Force goes a long way towards providing that protection.
Jesse Philips, Founder and Chairman Emeritus of Philips Industries, Inc., is a pioneer in the development of a national model
antidrug program for industry.
Mr. Philips was appointed by President Reagan as a member
of the White House Conference for a Drug Free America. He
was Chairman of the "Drugs in the Workplace" section of the
Conference. He has briefed President Bush on the demand side
of drug policy. He has appeared on The Today Show and the
MacNefl-Lehrer Report discussing his anti-drug program. His
remarks have been circulated in over 200 newspapers. He has
written on this subject for the Wall Street Journal and Random
House Books. The American Management Association and others
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have reprinted and distributed the Philips Industries model program.
I was the only member from business and industry on the
committee.
Unfortunately, the majority of the committee had little first hand
knowledge of or experience with the problems as they actually exist
in the many diverse work environments. The originalthrust of the
committee was to protect our perceived civil liberties at almost any
cost.
A review of the proposed law might give one the impression that
the thrust of the proposed law is not to encourage the elimination
of the use of drugs nor to encourage drug-testing as a proven
effective means of helping to eliminate the use of drugs in the
workplace.
I hope that this law will not discourage the small scale employer
from adopting a drug abuse program, which to be effective, has to
encompass drug-testing.
This law as a practical matter prohibitsprehiring tests. Applicants may only be tested after they are hired and have the rights
of an employee. I strongly oppose this section.
Also, the penalties proposed in the law on the employer are much
too harsh. The employee, however, is subject to a maximum of 30
days suspension if he tests positive. There is no safeguardprovision
that he is clean before he may return to the workplace.
The committee worked very hard, diligently, sincerely, and in
good faith to secure a working compromise. I believe the final draft,
although flawed in a few aspects, is a good document which can be
a helpful tool in forging national drug-testing legislation.
David Rabban is the Vinson and Elkins Professor of Law at the
University of Texas School of Law. He is an expert in labor law
and in constitutional history.
Mr. Rabban received his B.A., magna cum laude, from Wesleyan
University and his J.D. from Stanford Law School, where he
served as articles editor of the Stanford Law Review. Prior to
joining the faculty of the University of Texas, Mr. Rabban was
Counsel of the American Association of University Professors
and was in private practice, specializing in labor law, in New
York City.
The members of the Task Force, representing a broad range of
backgrounds and views, worked effectively together in addressing
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the complicated and important issues raisedby testingfor substance
abuse in the workplace. The Task Force reached a remarkable
degree of consensus regarding many controversial issues. Like
many members of the Task Force, I compromised some of my own
positions to reach this consensus. With one significant exception,
section 6(e) dealing with testing applicantsfor employment, I believe
that the statute proposed by the Task Force is afair and pragmatic
compromise that can serve as an excellent model for legislation.
I strenuously oppose testing all job applicants as a condition of
employment, as section 6(e) provides. Indeed, I believe that this
provision is inconsistent with the fundamental justificationfor the
entire statute. As the introduction emphasizes, the Task Force
agreed that "drug-testing implicated privacy interests of the highest
order, and therefore testing should be regulated to preserve individual privacy and dignity." The Task Force thus concluded that
"testing in the workplace may only be justified by concerns relevant
to the workplace, such as the safety of workers or the public.'"
Interests in privacy and dignity, in my opinion, do not depend on
whether an individual is an employee or an applicant. The workplace concerns that have prompted the Task Force to permit even
random testing in a number of situationsapply equally to employees
and to potential employees. I find no workplace concern that justifies testing applicantsfor jobs in which existing employees may
not be tested.
David M. Silberman is Associate General Counsel of the AFLCIO. Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Silberman was
a partner with the law firm of Bredhoff & Kaiser in Washington,
D.C. and an adjunct professor of law at George Washington
University School of Law.
He received his B.A., summa cum laude, from Brandeis University and his J.D., magna cum laude, from Harvard University.
After law school, Mr. Silberman clerked for Chief Judge David
Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia and for Justice Thurgood Marshall of the United
States Supreme Court.
It is with a great deal of ambivalence that I join in supporting
the provisions of the model law which authorize drug-testing of
incumbent employees without cause.
The premise of the "non-cause" provisions is that a positive test
result identifies a dangerous or unreliable employee. That premise
is fundamentally flawed.
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Marijuanausers accountfor upwards of 90 percent of all positive
drug test results; that is because, due to a fluke of biology, marijuana-unlike alcohol-leaves an inactive by-product that remains
in the urine for days or even weeks after the marijuana was
ingested. Thus, the very most that a positive test for marijuana
signifies-assuming that the test result is a true positive and not
the result of human or mechanical error-is that the employee in
question is a marijuanauser who has ingested marijuanawithin
some prior period of time. That fact is no more probative of an
individual'sfitness for employment than the fact that an individual
is an "alcohol drinker"-a description which fits large numbers of
persons in the workforce today. It is only because of our social
mores-mores which, I suspect, reflect more than a small amount
of anti-youth, anti-black bias-that we view marijuana use so
differently than alcohol use.
For all these reasons I would have much preferred a model
statute, which like the law of Vermont, prohibits testing without
cause. I join in supporting this model act, however, because in the
current climate I doubt that many states, or the federal government,
would agree to such a prohibition, and because the model statute
at least places strict limits on random testing and provides important protection to employees.
In the latter regard, I believe the model bill would be greatly
strengthened if it: (i) required advance notice of random testing so
as to lessen the en terrorem effect of such tests (ii) excused from
random testing employees who had completed a specified level of
service and who therefore were beyond the years of drug use; and
(iii)permitted random testing only where attempts to establish
individualized suspicion were impractical or unavailing. I regret
that I was unable to persuade my colleagues to include such
additionalprotections in the model law.
Margaret P. Spencer is a Professor of Law at the College of
William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, and Senior
Administrative Law Judge of the Department of Medical Assistance Services of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Ms. Spencer is a graduate of Howard University and of the
University of Virginia School of Law. Prior to joining the faculty
at William and Mary, she was Assistant Attorney General for
the Commonwealth of Virginia, a Senior Appellate Attorney with
the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and
an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, and was
in private law practice in Richmond, Virginia.
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As Rod Smolla's introduction suggests, the need for a "levelheaded and even-handed" drug testing statute is a reality, rather
than a possibility. This Substance Abuse Testing Act is such a
statute. It represents a much needed balance between the obvious
invasion of privacy which accompanies substance abuse testing and
the equally obvious need to detect and prevent drug and alcohol use
in the workplace. More importantly, this Act requiresfair procedures for regulating substance abuse tests, andforces employers to
recognize that employees who use drugs and alcohol need treatment,
counseling and rehabilitation.
There will be opposition to this statute. Many of us are concerned
aboutfalse positive test results and the adverse impact of "blanket"
applicant testing. However, experience has taught us that the "war
on drugs" must be fought from within-by the users or potential
users. To the extent that this statute will have the residual effect
of curbing drug and alcohol use, its benefits outweigh any detriments. The statute is a positive step in the right direction.
Carlton E. Turner is President and Chief Executive Officer of
Princeton Diagnostic Laboratories of America (PDLA). Prior to
joining PDLA in 1987, Dr. Turner served for five and a half
years as President Reagan's principal advisor on domestic and
international drug issues. He oversaw the drafting of the Executive Order (12564) requiring drug-testing for federal employees,
and was instrumental in the development of Nancy Reagan's
"Crusade for a Drug Free America".
Dr. Turner was also responsible for developing and implementing the military's successful drug-testing program which
reduced illegal drug use among military personnel by 67 percent
in two years. Dr. Turner also served as Research Professor and
Director of the Research Institute of Pharmaceutical Sciences
School of Pharmacy at the University of Mississippi. He has
earned an international reputation as a scientist for his expertise
in drug-related matters and has published over 125 scientific
papers on drug-abuse subjects and policy issues.
This diverse group was heavily weighted toward the legal profession. Thus, originally, concepts of drug-testing were from published
articles and not based on first-hand knowledge of actual state of
the art practices. Through much debate this was overcome and a
viable document was drafted, revised and published. While I cannot
agree with every sentence in the document, I can, however, accept
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the honest dialogue and approach that allowed a philosophically
divergent group to reach a consensus on most issues.
In my opinion, if this draft legislation is accepted by legislative
bodies, it will not put an unfair burden on employers or employees
but rather will protect individual rights, maintain confidentiality,
and give employers a mechanism to ensure a drug-free workplace.
Leroy S. Zimmerman, now in private practice in Pennsylvania
with the firm of Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott, is a former
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and
was, prior to that, chief prosecutor for Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.
Mr. Zimmerman is a graduate of Villanova University and of
the Dickinson School of Law. He serves as a member of the
Board of Trustees of the Dickinson School of Law. He has been
an active participant in the debate over drug-testing and has
substantial expertise from a law enforcement perspective. He is
a past chairman of the Criminal Law Committee of the National
Association of Attorneys General and the Executive Working
Group comprised of federal, state and local prosecutors throughout the United States.
Mr. Zimmerman served as a member of the White House
Conference for a Drug Free America during the Reagan Administration.
The creation of this Task Force represents the best evidence that
the discussionand debate concerningsubstance abuse in our country
has properly shifted from an emphasis on "supply side" solutions
to "demand side" realities.
As the DistrictAttorney of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, during the early 1970's, I found that parent, business, service and
community groups were reluctant to acknowledge that drugs were
a problem in their communities. Most people were convinced that
drugs were an inner city problem for law enforcement to solve.
Today, our educators, labor and business leaders are not just
discussing the impact of substance abuse on our children, our
workforce and the corporate bottom line, but are working together
and sharing the responsibility for developing solutions to this
problem.
I believe that drug-testing is an important component of any
comprehensive attack on substance abuse. It has become the centerpiece in the continuing effort to find a creative, effective and fair
way to make our workplaces safe, secure and more productive. In
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reality our workplaces are our communities. The people in those
communities expect leadership on the tough issues like substance
abuse. That leadership must come from all disciplines in our
society.
The Report of this Task Force combines the interdisciplinary
expertise and thinking of individuals who have been involved in
leadership roles in this important national debate.

